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NOTES
TORT REMEDY FOR RETALIATORY DISCHARGE:
ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
LIMITS EMPLOYER'S POWER TO DISCHARGE
EMPLOYEES TERMINABLE-AT-WILLKELSAY V. MOTOROLA, INC.
The long-standing rule that an employer may discharge a terminable-atwill employee' for just cause, no cause, or even a "cause [that is] morally
wrong" 2 has been examined with increasing frequency by courts 3 and commentators. 4 Confronted with a particularly harsh application of this rule in
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. ,5 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the retaliatory discharge of an employee for pursuing a workmen's compensation claim
offended the public policy of Illinois 6 as manifested in the Workmen's Compensation Act. 7 The court also held that such a discharge constituted a
tort' and gave rise to compensatory and punitive damages. By limiting all

1. "In [Illinois] the rule has long been established that a hiring at a monthly or annual
salary, if no duration is specified in the contract, is presumed to be at will and either party may
terminate the hiring at his pleasure without liability." Long v. Arthur Rubloff & Co., 27 I11.
App. 3d 1013, 1023, 327 N.E.2d 346, 353 (1st Dist. 1975). See, e.g., Loucks v. Star City Glass
Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977); Buian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970);
Roemer v. Zurich Insurance Co., 25 II1.App. 3d 606, 323 N.E.2d 582 (1st Dist. 1975); Atwood
v. Curtis Candy Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d 355 (1st Dist. 1959).
2. Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884), overruled on other grounds,
Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). One Illinois decision has expressed the
at-will rule in similarly extreme terms. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gibson, 135 I1. App. 290 (1st
Dist.), aff'd, 232 Ill. 49, 83 N.E. 539 (1907) (employer has lawful right to discharge employee
with or without cause, for any reason, however capricious and unfounded it might be).
3. See notes 22 and 55 infra.
4. The at-will rule has been the subject of considerable criticism in the last 15 years. See
Blades Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) (comprehensive examination of the nature
and effect of the at-will rule, its history, and the employee's need for a personal damage remedy
as a protection from abuse of the rule by employers) [hereinafter cited as Blades]; Feinman, The
Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976) (historical
evolution of the at-will rule traced and its relation to the development of advanced capitalism
discussed) [hereinafter cited as Feinman]; Peck, Some Kind of Hearing for Persons Discharged
from Private Employment, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 313 (1979) (judicial activism in extending
protection against improper termination of private sector employees urged) [hereinafter cited as
Some Kind of Hearing]; Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) (American statutes' piecemeal modification of the employer's
common law discharge power compared to the more comprehensive legal protection against
unjust dismissals provided in other industrial countries) [hereinafter cited as Summers].
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
5. 74 I11.
6. Id. at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
7. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 to .28 (1977).
8. 74 Ill. 2d at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59.
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employer's "otherwise absolute" 9 power to terminate at-will employees, the

Kelsay court demonstrated a clear understanding of the potential for abuse of
this power and indicated a willingness to intervene when an employer's discharge actions contravene important public policy considerations. 10
This Note examines the reasoning in Kelsay and criticizes its analysis of

prior case law. A legislative alternative expanding the protection -afforded
employees by Kelsay is suggested and a sample statute designed to achieve
this expansion is presented. Finally, the Kelsay decision's impact on the

enployer-employee relationship is discussed and a hypothetical that demonstrates a possible extension of the Kelsay public policy considerations is

analyzed.
THE TERMINABLE-AT-WILL RULE

The unqualified American rule empowering an employer to terminate an
at-will employee 11 originated approximately 100 years ago 1 2 and renains the
law today in most states.

13

The rule first was expressed in a treatise

14

and

9. Id. at 181, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
10, Id. at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
11. France, Germany, England, and Sweden protect against unjust dismissals by legislation,
thus avoiding the harshness of' the American rule. See Summers, supra note 4, at 508-19.
France statutorily adopted a principle known as "abus de droit," which makes abusive termination
a tort if the employer acted with malicious intent, culpable negligence, or capriciousness. Id. at
510. Germany prohibits dismissals that are "anti-social" in character, and requires a minimum
notice period of four weeks before a discharge can be effective, except in cases of serious
employee misconduct. Id. at 511. In 1971, England adopted a statute providing comprehensive
protection against unjust dismissal. Id. at 513. Sweden also has a fairly comprehensive unjustdismissal statute requiring written notice of the dismissal at least one month in advance. The
Swedish statute also requires that the dismissal be for "an objective cause" that must be proven
by the employer. Id. at 517. These four countries had harsh common law discharge rules similar
to the American rule, but all have softened the rule's impact by comprehensive statutes.
12. See note 14 iufra.
13. 9 S. WILLISTON, A 'REATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS 1017 (3d ed. 1967); 53 AM.
JUR. 2d Master and Servant § 43 (1970). One jurisdiction has abandoned the rule. See Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). The court in Monge held that an
employer's termination of an at-will employment contract is not in the best interests of the
economic system or the public good where the termination is motivated by bad faith, malice, or
retaliation and that such a termination constitutes a breach of the employment contract. This
decision has evoked considerable commentary but has not been followed by other jurisdictions.
See Note, A Remedy for Malicious Discharge of the At-Will Employee: Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 7 CONN. L. REV. 758 (1975) (Monge court's reasoning examined and some implications of
the decision suggested); Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975) (tort remedy proposed as alternative to contract analysis in
Monge) [hereinafter cited as A Common Law Action]; Comment, Employment Contracts Terminable At Will: Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. and Bad Faith Discharges, 63 KY. L.J. 513
(1975) (contract theory underlying at-will rule explored and the effect of Monge discussed). Like
Monge, the Kelsay decision also has triggered commentary. See Filippi and Popko, Workmen's
Compensation: New Cause of Action for Retaliatory Discharge, 68 ILL. B.J. 329 (1980); Note,
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.-Tort Action for Retaliatory Discharge Upon Filing Workmen's Compensation Claims, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 659 (1979); Recent Decisions, 68 ILL. B.J. 287
(1979).
14. The rule's origin generally is traced to the following statement by H.G. Wood:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
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later was declared a constitutional right in a series of United States Supreme
Court decisions based on extreme notions of laissez-faire economics. 15 Although the treatise has been proven erroneous1 6 and the Supreme Court has
abandoned its early laissez-faire position, 17 the rule remains. In fact, the
rule is so firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence that courts frequently accept it without serious analysis and occasionally without citation. 18
While the employer's power to terminate an at-will employee generally is
considered absolute under the common law, statutory exceptions are found
in federal 1 9 and state 20 legislation that prohibit discharges based on the
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is
upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year,
no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it
was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed or whatever time the party may serve.
H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). For a
discussion focusing primarily on the at-will rule's historical development, see generally Feinman, supra note 4. A comparison of the Illinois rule, supra note 1, with Wood's rule indicates
that the rule has changed little in approximately 100 years, with only a few laudable exceptions
such as the Kelsay and Monge decisions.
15. The cases best representing this laissez-faire approach are Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In both cases the Supreme Court
invalidated legislation forbidding yellow-dog (anti-union) contracts. The reasoning supporting
these decisions was that both parties to the employment contract should be free to leave at any
time and, therefore, legislation forbidding the discharge of employees for their refusal to sign
yellow-dog contracts was unconstitutional. The challenged statutes forced employers to retain
the services of unwanted employees when the employers should have been free to discharge.
One author has explained that the Supreme Court's extreme laissez-faire position was representative of the prevalent 19th century belief that rapid economic growth was socially desirable
because, theoretically, all society would enjoy the benefits of such growth. See A Common Law
Action, supra note 13, at 1441. Another reason advanced for these laissez-faire beliefs was that
the late 19th century was a period when business failure was common and the courts consequently felt compelled to protect industry and the employer. The terminable-at-will rule was
formulated to this end. 1d. at 1440.
16. One writer has shown that the four cases Wood cited as authority for his rule, supra
note 14, did not support his position. See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Job Security]. See also, Blumrosen,
Employer Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 432-33 (1964) (after Wood's
treatise, application of the at-will rule spread rapidly throughout the country and the rule remains the standard text statement of the common law).
17. The cases cited in note 15 supra were later "sapped of their authority" by NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), according to Professor Blades. For a more
thorough discussion of these Supreme Court decisions, see Blades, supra note 4, at 1415-19.
18. The Kelsay decision is a good example. The court did not cite authority for the
employer's "traditional right to discharge at will," yet a major issue in Kelsay was whether the
right should be a limited one. Automatic acceptance of the rule without analysis was a conmon
occurrence when the rule first was announced at the beginning of the 20th century. See Job
Security, supra note 16, at 342 nn. 57 & 58.
19. Some examples of federal legislation are: Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7512(a)
(1976) (agency may take adverse action against eligible employee only for such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the agency's service); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1674(a) (1976) (no employer may discharge any employee simply because the employee's earnings have been subjected to garnishment); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 148(a)
(1976) (employer's power to discharge restricted incertain circumstances); Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976) (unlawful for employer to discharge any employee
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race, sex, or age of an employee. Case law also has established exceptions to
this "inflexible" 21 rule, usually on the ground that it violates public policy. 22 Many courts, however, have not modified the rule, 23 resulting in a
because such employee has filed a complaint or instituted a proceeding under the Fair Labor
Standards Act); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976) (employer
prohibited from discharging employee because of employee's age); Occupational Health &
Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976) (employer prohibited from discharging employee
because employee testified in or brought a proceeding under the Occupational Health & Safety
Act). See generally Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 13-17 (1979) (comprehensive discussion of federal, state, and local govensmental regulation of the employment relationship) [hereinafter cited as Unjust Employment
Discharges].
20. For examples of state laws limiting the employer's absolute discharge power, see [19791
43045, 43055. See also [1979] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.
1 LAB. L. REP. (State Laws) (CCH)
(BNA) 51:501-23. For similar Illinois laws, see note 105 iufra.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. The following courts have recognized a public-policy exception to the terminable-at-will
rule: Peterman v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee's
dismissal for refusing to commit perjury violated public policy); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N. E.2d 425 (1973) (employee's disnissal for filing workmen's compensation claim violated public policy); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151
(1976) (employee's discharge for filing workmen's compensation claim contravened public policy); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (female employee's firing
for refusing foreman's sexual advances was in bad faith and constituted a breach of the at-will
employment contract because such bad faith breaches are not in the best interests of society);
Nees v. Ilocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (employee's termination for serving jury duty
against employer's directions violated public policy). For a more exhaustive list of related cases,
see Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows The Whistle": A
Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wisc. L. REv. 777, 786
Ihereinafter cited a,: Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee]. But see note 57 infra
for cases that have not embraced the policy response to retaliatory discharge.
An interesting case, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), held
that bad faith discharges constituted a breach of the at-will employment contract. The discharged female employee in the Alonge case refused to be sexually "nice" to her foreman in
order to secure a promotion. She did not exhaust available union grievance and arbitration
remedies before bringing her suit, although she was a union memiber. The exhaustion of these
remedies is required before a union employee may bring a separate wrongful discharge action,
unless the union employee can prove the union arbitrarily or discriminatorily settled the
employee's claim. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Thus the Monge decision does not
establish a common law discharge action fbr union employees, although its reasoning does support a discharge action for non-union employees. For a more detailed discussion of the Monge
decision's impact on state discharge actions for organized employees, see A Common Law Action, supra note 13, at 1457-63.
The Monge decision was not mentioned by the Illinois Supreme Court in Kelsay, although
the New Hampshire decision was raised by the appellant. Brief for Appellant at 19. This does
not imply that the Kelsay court disagrees with the Monge court's conclusion that bad faith
discharges are not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good. More probably the Kelsay majority omitted any reference to the Monge decision because no breach of
contract allegations were made by the appellant. See note 31 infra. But see Sargent v. Illinois
Inst. of Tech., 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1979) (retaliatory discharge action
based on express and implied contract allegations dismissed for failure to allege tort violation).
23. These courts usually reason that the employer's absolute power to discharge should be
modified by the legislature, not the judiciary. See Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745
(7th Cir. 1977); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).

19801

KELSAY V. MOTOROLA

split of authority. 24 This split of authority over the at-will doctrine's status
recently arose between two panels of the Illinois Appellate Court and was
resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court in Kelsay.
THE FACTS

Marilyn Jo Kelsay, a Motorola employee whose employment contract was
terminable at-will, was injured 25 while working in the defendant's factory.
She received the necessary medical attention 26 and later filed a workmen's
compensation claim based on the injury. 27 After receiving notice of the
claim, the personnel manager approached Kelsay and told her that she
would be "more than adequately compensat[ed]" by Motorola if she did not
advance her claim. 28 Kelsay also was informed of the company's policy of
terminating employees who pursue workmen's compensation claims. 29 She

24. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 979, 981-82 (1975).
25. The plaintiff commenced employment with the defendant company on January 3, 1973.
On February 28, 1973, while operating an unfamiliar machine, Kelsay cut her thumb. Record at
5-7.
26. The plaintiff's injury apparently was minor. She returned to work the same day she
received stitches in her thumb. 74 I11. 2d at 178, 384 N.E.2d at 355-56. Kelsay eventually was
compensated for her injury and her medical expenses were paid. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51
Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1017, 366 N.E.2d 1141, 1142 (4th Dist. 1977), rev'd, 74 I11. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978).
27. Workmen's compensation is a statutory creation. See note 7 supra. Prior to the Workmen's Compensation Act, injured employees had considerable difficulty recovering under
negligence theory because of the common law defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule. See 1 T. ANGERSTEIN, ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2 (rev. ed. 1952); 81 AM. JuR. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 2 (1976). Unable to work
or recover damages, injured workers experienced financial hardship due to medical and family
maintenance expenses. The Workmen's Compensation Act was passed to remedy these problems by providing speedy and inexpensive relief. For a recent analysis of the present state of
the Illinois workmen's compensation system, see Stevenson, The Illinois Workmen's Compensation System: A Description and Critique, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 675 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Stevenson]. For some comments on the economic impact of Illinois' Workmen's Compensation
Act, see Parrish, Workmen's Compensation Law in Illinois: Some Economic Consequences of
Recent Changes, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 715 (1978).
28. 74 Ill. 2d at 179, 384 N.E.2d at 356.
29. After being informed of the policy to terminate employees who pursue workmen's compensation claims, Kelsay was told to "'think about it." Id. at 179, 384 N.E.2d at 356. According
to the defendant's personnel manager, no written company policy of terminating such
employees existed, nor was he ever actually told of this policy. Record at 64. Motorola's policy
of dismissing workmen's compensation claimants apparently was inferred from its awareness of
the reason underlying Kelsay's termination. The personnel manager submitted a form to
Motorola's divisional office for Kelsay's removal from the payroll. On this form appeared "w/c,"
indicating a workmen's compensation suit. Record at 61. Thus, future retaliatory discharge
plaintiffs should examine company payroll records and employee time cards in addition to questioning company personnel. The existence of written records informally documenting the
reasons for discharge could be crucial to establish that the employee's wrongful discharge contention is not just a bald assertion.
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proceeded with her claim and later was discharged. ° Although the workmen's compensation action eventually was settled, the plaintiff sought relief
for her retaliatory discharge in the circuit court. 31
The trial court found for Kelsay, awarding $25,000 punitive damages in
addition to $749 compensatory damages. 32 The appellate court reversed
and held that an at-will employee had no cause of action against an employer
for retaliatory discharge. a3 In another case, however, a different panel of
the appellate court heard essentially the same issue but reached an opposite
result. 4 Thus, a certificate of importance was issued to the Illinois Supreme Court to resolve the conflict. 3' The supreme court, in Kelsay, held

that a cause of action existed for retaliatory discharge. The court stated in
dicta that, in the future, punitive damages would be recoverable in similar
cases, but denied Kelsay that form of relief. 36

THE DECISION

After reviewing the facts, the court stated the three questions presented
in Kelsay: first, whether the state should recognize a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge; 3 7 second, if retaliatory discharge was actionable,

30. The discharge occurred on June 6, 1973, immediately after Kelsay told the personnel
manager her decision. The parties had engaged in several conversations on the subject before
the June 6 encounter. Record at 10-15.
31. The plaintiff's complaint was framed solely in tort. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 111. App.
3d at 1016, 366 N.E.2d at 1142. In paragraph 10 of plaintiff's second amended complaint the
following allegation appeared: "The discharge of the Plaintiff by the Defendant was for no cause
other than the fact that she had filed
an application for adjustment of her claim arising under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and had refused to withdraw that claim after Defendant's
threats and intimidation." Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 2. By framing the complaint
solely in tort, the plaintiff avoided the problems of establishing retaliatory or abusive discharge
as a contract action. For analysis of the problems with contract theory as a basis for retaliatory
discharge, see Blades and Summers, supra note 4, and note 66 infra. See also Job Security,
supra note 16.
32. The jury originally awarded $1000 compensatory damages, but the trial court remitted
the amount to $749. 74 II1. 2d at 178, 384 N.E.2d at 355.
33. 51 II1. App. 3d at 1020, 366 N.E.2d at 1144-45. The appellate court reviewed other
employment legislation and concluded the legislature's omission of a civil remedy was intentional; therefore, any change had to be effected by the legislature.
34. Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 111. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (4th Dist. 1977)
(retaliatory discharge for pursuing workmen's compensation held actionable). Justice Craven,
dissenting in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 111. App. 3d at 1021, 366 N.E.2d at 1145, noted that
the Blades article, supra note 4, was "most persuasive." He cited the article again in the Leach
decision, which he authored for the majority. 51 I1.App. 3d at 1025, 366 N.E.2d at 1147.
35. 58 11.2d R. 316. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 316 states: "Appeals from the Appellate
Court shall lie to the Supreme Court upon certification by a division of the Appellate Court that
a case decided by it involves a question of such importance that it should be decided by the
Supreme Court."
36. 74 Ill. 2d at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
37. Id.at 179, 384 N.E.2d at 356.
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whether punitive damages were recoverable; 38 and if so, whether the punitive damages award was proper in the instant case.39
Arguing the first issue, Motorola urged that no cause of action should be
recognized because at the time Kelsay was injured the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act) contained no limitation on the employer's right to discharge.°40 Motorola also contended that the exclusivity provision of the
Act, 41 limiting the employer's responsibility for compensation to certain
enumerated situations, indicated the legislature's intention that the Act
should be the sole measure of employee rights and remedies. 42 This provision, it argued, barred the implication of additional rights or remedies. The
defendant's final contention was that the Act's 1975 amendment criminalizing
retaliatory discharge 43 demonstrated the General Assembly's intention to
exclude civil actions because they were not considered an appropriate reinedy. 44

The Illinois Supreme Court rejected all of Motorola's contentions and allowed a private cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 45 The court
explained that the Act's purpose was to provide automatic recovery to
employees for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. 46
Efficient remedies for the protection of injured employees were found to
promote the general welfare and, consequently, were in furtherance of
sound public policy. 47 In view of the Act's purpose and the public policy it
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Plaintiff's injury occurred in February, 1973, and her discharge was on June 6, 1973.
The Workmen's Compensation Act amendment prohibiting retaliatory discharge was not effective until 1975. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (1975). For this provision's text, see note
43 infra.
41. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.11 (1973) provides: "The compensation herein provided,
together with the provisions of this Act, shall be the measure of the responsibility of any
employer engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses enumerated in Section 3 of this
Act ...."
42. 74 II1. 2d at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
43. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (1975) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any employer, insurance company or service or adjustment company to interfere with, restrain or coerce an employee in any manner
whatsoever in the exercise of the rights or remedies granted to him by this Act ...
It shall be unlawful for any employer, individually or through any insurance company or service or adjustment company, to discharge or to threaten to discharge, or
to refuse to rehire or recall to active service in a suitable capacity an employee
because of the exercise of his rights or remedies granted to him by this Act.
44. 74 I11.
2d at 184-85, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
45. Id. at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59.
46. Id. at 180-81, 384 N.E.2d at 356.
47. Id. at 181, 384 N.E.2d at 357. See Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261 II1. 454, 104 N.E.
211 (1914) (the Workmen's Compensation Act is a declaration by the legislature of the public
policy of the state). Although the court relied on the public policy declared by the legislature,
see note 48 infra, other factors can be considered when determining the public policy. One
authority states:
There are formal expressions and manifestations of public policy in the mandates,
norms, and guidelines declared in federal and state constitutions, statutes, judicial
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expressed, 48 the majority reasoned that allowing employers to exercise their
unlimited discharge power could force employees to choose between
employment and rights under the Act. 49 This result was considered untenable. The court therefore concluded that this result could not have been
intended by the legislature, even in the absence of an explicit proscription
against such employer conduct. 50
To support its conclusion that a cause of action existed prior to the 1975
amendment criminalizing retaliatory discharge, the Kelsay court examined
relevant case law. The supreme court rejected a Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decision that denied a cause of action for retaliatory discharge,
Loucks v. Star City Glass Co. 51 The Loucks court reasoned that no cause
of action should exist because the Act contained no limitation on the
52
employer's traditional right to discharge at the time of Loucks' dismissal.
In rejecting Loucks, the Kelsay majority noted that the Loucks court lacked
the guidance of Illinois precedent in its interpretation of the Act.5 3 The
supreme court also noted that federal decisions construing state statutes
were not binding on state courts, concluding that the Loucks court's con54
struction of the Act contravened Illinois public policy.
decisions, and sundry other avenues through which the official decisions and actions
of organized society are registered. In a larger and less formalized sense, countless
manifestations of public mores, attitudes, and sentiments may be, in effect, judicially noticed as sources on the basis of which to declare public policy. Policy directives may be perceived, moreover, as imperatives derived from modern economic,
social and political conditions.
2A. J. SUTHERLAND, S'TATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 56.01, at 401 (4th ed. 1973). See also Marchlik v. Cornet his. Co., 40 111.2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968) (public policy includes judicial
decisions, legislation, constitutions, customs, morals, and notions of justice prevailing within the
state). Based on the factors enumerated by Professor Sutherland, the Kelsay court's realistic
appraisal of the injured employee's plight, that of having to choose between employment and
rights under the Act, was a legitimate consideration because such a plight is a modern economic
condition.
48. Id. The Act's preamble expresses the public policy that compensation should be available to injured workers. The preamble declares the Workmen's Compensation Act to be "[an
Act to promote the general welfare of the People of this State by providing compensation for
accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment within this State ....
" ILL.
REV. SrAr. ch. 48, § 138 (1977).
49. 74 Ill. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
50. Id.
51. 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977) (court of appeals, construing the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, held that a civil cause of action for retaliatory discharge would not have been
omitted from such comprehensive and integrated legislation if intended and that its omission
therefore precluded a civil action). Accord, Green v. Armerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212, 214
(5th Cir. 1980) (court of appeals construed the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law and
held that the absence of an explicit statutory provision of a civil remedy argued against recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge).
52. 551 F.2d at 748.
53. 74 I11.
2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
54. Id. Referring to the plaintiff, the Loucks court stated that though his "claims have a
certain appeal to notions of fairness," the matter was a legislative determination against Loucks.
The Loucks court was urged to consider Kelsay, but declined as Kelsay was then only a trial
decision and therefore not necessarily the law of Illinois. 551 F.2d at 746.
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The Kelsay court also examined opinions by the Indiana and Michigan
state courts, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. 55 and Sventko v. Kroger
Co. 56 Without analyzing these decisions in depth, 57 the Kelsay court mentioned that both state courts relied on public policy in recognizing retaliatory
discharge. 5' The majority in Kelsay explained that "the overriding principle
55. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (retaliatory discharge resulting from filing of workmen's compensation claim held to be a prohibited "device" within the meaning of the Indiana
Workmen's Compensation Act and therefore actionable). The Frampton decision has received
considerable attention in decisions throughout the United States. Accord, Raden v. City of
Azuza, 97 Cal, App. 3d 336, 158 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1979); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151
(1976); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1976); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119
(1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1978). Contra,
Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977); Percival v. General Motors Corp.,
529 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Penn.
1977); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Penn. 1976); Larsen v.
Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (App. Ct. 1977); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp.,
364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293,
244 S.E.2d 272, petition for discretionary review denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978);
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
56. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) (discharge of employee in retaliation for
filing workmen's compensation claim violated public policy even though the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act did not prohibit retaliatory discharge).
57. The court probably discussed the Frampton and Sventko decisions because they were
the only workmen's compensation cases supporting the court's position. Several decisions, however, do not favor the court's reasoning in Kelsay. See Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295
S.W.2d 122 (1956) (Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act was considered so comprehensive
that the inclusion of criminal penalties for discharge was construed to mean civil remedies were
intentionally omitted); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978)
(North Carolina has rejected retaliatory eviction doctrine, so the Frampton decision's analogy
between retaliatory eviction and retaliatory discharge was rejected); Raley v. Darling Shop of
Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950) (employee's discharge for pursuing workmen's compensation claim was rejected because the employee failed to properly allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action and because the employee was terminable at-will and
therefore subject to discharge at any, time).
58. 74 Ill. 2d at 181-84, 384 N.E.2d at 357-58. The Frampton case involved a woman
employee who was injured on the job, but returned to work apparently recovered. Nineteen
months after her return, she discovered she had lost 30% use of her injured arm. 260 Ind. at
250, 297 N.E.2d at 426. One month after she received a settlement for her subsequent arm
problem, Frampton was dismissed with no reason given for her termination. Id. After noting
that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be construed liberally, the Indiana Supreme
Court interpreted the statutory prohibition against "devices" relieving the employer of its obligation to compensate injured employees to include retaliatory discharges. Id. at 252, 297
N.E.2d at 427-28. For the text of the Indiana statute, see note 60 infra. The Frampton court
analogized retaliatory discharge to retaliatory eviction because there was no case law recognizing
retaliatory discharge. The court reasoned that "[t]he fear of retaliation for reporting [housing]
violations inhibits reporting and, like the fear of retaliation for filing a claim, ultimately undermines a critically important public policy [that of compensating injured workers]." Id. at 253,
297 N.E.2d at 428. Retaliatory discharge therefore was recognized as an exception to the at-will
rule. Id. Frampton is the landmark case establishing retaliatory discharge as an exception to the
at-will rule. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.36 (Supp. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as LARSON].
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that compensation should be available to injured workers" 59 was the
critical aspect of the Frampton decision, not the Indiana court's express reliance on the statutory language prohibiting employer devices for avoiding
liability. 60 The Kelsay court reasoned that the absence of a similar prohibition in the Illinois Act did not mean that retaliatory discharge was any less
offensive to the public policy of Illinois. 6' The supreme court therefore
held that the public policy underlying the Act limited the employer's absolute power to discharge at-will employees. 62
Having determined that the employer's discharge power was not absolute,
the court considered the effects of both the Act's exclusivity provision and
the 1975 amendment on the availability of a civil remedy. 63 The majority
decided that neither precluded the implication of a civil remedy. 64 The
exclusivity provision, although limiting the employer's compensation responsibility arising under the Act, 6 5 was held to apply only to work-related injuries, not to independent torts such as retaliatory discharge.66

...

The Sventko case arose three years after the Frampton decision. Judge Allen, concurring in
Sventko, cited Frampton, Monge, and Peterman v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee's dismissal for refusing to commit perjury violated public policy).
69 Mich. App. at 651, 245 N.W.2d at 155. Sventko suffered a back injury, received compensation, and later was terminated. Sventko alleged her discharge was solely because she filed a
workmen's compensation claim. Id. at 649, 245 N.W.2d at 154. For the similar complaint filed
by the plaintiff in Kelsay, see note 31 supra.
The Sventko court declared that it was impossible to retaliatorily discharge an employee and
not contravene the public policy, reasoning that "[an employer cannot accept that benefit
[freedom from common law liability provided by the Act] for himself and yet attempt to prevent
the application of the act to the work-related injuries of his employees without acting in direct
contravention of public policy." Id. at 648, 245 N.W.2d at 153-54. The Illinois Supreme Court
adopted similar reasoning in Kelsay. 74 I11. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
59. 74 II1. 2d at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
60. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15 (Burns 1974) provides: -[N]o contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device shall, in any manner, operate to relieve any
employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this act." (Emphasis added).
61. 74 I11.2d at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
62. Id. at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 357-58.
63. See notes 41 and 43 supra.
64. 74 Ill. 2d at 184-85, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59.
65. See note 41 supra.
66. 74 Ill. 2d at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358. By characterizing retaliatory discharge as an independent tort, the Kelsay court not only avoided the Act's exclusivity provision, but also the
problems involved in a contract analysis. The contract concepts of mutuality of obligation and
consideration inhibit the modification of the harsh at-will rule, the major obstacle to recognizing
retaliatory discharge. Mutuality of obligation requires that the employer be free to fire at any
time for any reason because the employee is free to quit at any time for any reason. See Blades,
supra note 4, at 1419. See, e.g., Meadows v. Radio Indus., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955).
Illinois, however, recognizes that mutuality of obligation is not essential to the validity of a
contract. See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 II1. 102, 133 N.E.
711 (1921) (consideration is essential to the validity of a contract but mutuality of obligation is
not).
While mutuality of obligation can be overcome, separate consideration is needed to support a
promise of continued employment because the employee's wages are regarded as full compensation for his or her efforts. See generally Blades, supra note 4, at 1419-21; Note, Employment
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The Kelsay majority similarly concluded that the 1975 amendment providing criminal penalties for retaliatory discharge 67 does not prevent the implication of a civil remedy. 68 The court reasoned that the omission of a civil
remedy does not reflect a conscious decision by the legislature that no such
remedy should exist. 69 Rather, the criminal sanctions were considered insufficient to deter unscrupulous employers from risking the small statutory
fine in order to escape their responsibility under the Act. 70 The court also
pointed out that a small state fine does not alleviate the plight of employees
threatened with retaliatory discharge for pursuing their rights. 71 In addition, the supreme court stated that where a statute is enacted for the benefit
of a particular class of individuals, the mere provision of criminal penalties
does not necessarily bar the implication of civil remedies, even where civil
remedies are not expressly mentioned in the statute. 72 The Kelsay majority
thus determined that the absence of a civil remedy in the Workmen's Compensation Act did not preclude the court from creating such a remedy. 73
Addressing the two remaining issues, the Kelsay court stated that although
punitive damages would be appropriate74 in future 75 retaliatory discharge
Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 107, 121 (1942). Thus the discharge
power remains absolute absent separate consideration.
The tort approach used by the Kelsay court is more flexible than the contract approach because the rigid requirement of consideration is not present. See generally A Common Law
Action, supra note 13, at 1454-56.
67. See note 43 supra.
68. 74 II1. 2d at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358. For a general discussion of the implied action
problem, see notes 103-13 and accompanying text infra.
69. 74 I11. 2d at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
70. Id. at 185, 187, 384 N.E.2d at 359.
71. Id. at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 359.
72. Id. The court relied on Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 128
N.E.2d 691 (1955), as authority for this proposition. In Heiingaertnerthe court recognized that
civil actions could be implied from statutes that were penal in nature. Id. at 155, 128 N.E.2d at
693. On the facts, however, the Heimgaertner court held unconstitutional a statute that allowed
employees to collect their daily salary while voting on election day. Id. at 167, 128 N.E.2d at
699. For a detailed discussion of when courts should imply civil remedies from statutes that are
penal in nature, see notes 103-13 and accompanying text infra.
73. 74 Ill. 2d at 184-85, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59.
74. Id. at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361. Professor Blades also believes that punitive damages are
appropriate in retaliatory discharge actions. See Blades, supra note 4, at 1427. For a detailed
discussion of the appropriateness of punitive damages in retaliatory discharge actions under the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, see Recent Decisions, 68 ILL. B.J. 287, 290-91 (1979).
For a general discussion of punitive damages in Illinois, see McKillup, Punitive Damages in
Illinois: Review and Reappraisal, 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 571 (1978).
The importance of recognizing retaliatory discharge as a tort, rather than a contract action,
supra note 66, is evident in the awarding of damages. Punitive damages are not recoverable for
wrongful discharge when the cause of action is based on breach of contract because breach of
contract actions generally do not give rise to punitive damages. 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1340 (3d ed. 1968). See also 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant §
58(c) (1948); 53 AM. JuR. 2d Master and Servant § 63 (1970). Compare Brandwen, PunitiveExemplary Damages in Labor Relations Litigation, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 460, 465-67 (1962),
where the author questions whether punitive damages actually deter conduct.
75. The technique the supreme court utilized in Kelsay to allow punitive damages in future
retaliatory discharge actions while denying them in the instant case is known as prospective
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actions, punitive damages were not proper in the instant case. 7 The supreme court considered punitive damages a form of punishment, serving as a
warning to deter others from engaging in proscribed conduct. The function
of dissuading employers from attempting such discharges

77

in the future was

not served in Kelsay because Illinois lacked precedent warning the defendant that retaliatory discharge practices were actionable. In fact, precedent in
other states indicated such practices were legitimate. 78 The supreme court
therefore concluded that allowing punitive damages in Kelsay would be unfair because the cause of action was novel, but stated that punitive damages
would be proper in similar cases in the future. 79
overruling. At common law, new decisions were given retroactive effect based on the theory
that the new decision announced or discovered the preexisting law. The overruled decision was
not the law at all; therefore, the overruling decision was applied to past cases. See Note,
Retroactivity in Civil Suits: Linkletter Modified, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 653, 655 (1974). For the
historical development of retroactivity in judicial decisions, see generally Note, Prospective
Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 907-12 (1962).
In contrast, the objective of prospective overruling is "to rid the law of an unsound rule and
at the same time preclude undue hardship to a party that has justifiably relied on it." See
Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 543 (1977). This was the case in Kelsay because the defendant relied on the
terminable at-will rule conferring absolute discharge power upon the employer. The Kelsay
court concluded that imposing punitive damages on the defendant would be "extremely unfair"
because the defendant reasonably could have believed that firing Kelsay was a legitimate exercise of its termination power. 74 I11.2d at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
76. The supreme court recently explained that "[e]xcepting the cause in which the decision
is rendered has consistently been the practice [of the Illinois Supreme Court] in cases involving
[the recognition of new] torts." Silver Mfg. Co. v. General Box Co., 76 II1. 2d 413, 416, 392
N.E.2d 1343, 1344 (1979). After citing several cases, the Silver Mfg. court discussed the Kelsay
decision. The Silver Mfg. court noted that the reason for prospective application in Kelsay and
the other tort decisions cited was that those awards were penal in nature. In Silver Mfg. the
defendants sought an exemption from the prospective application of the rule of contribution
announced in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Packaging Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1978). The
Silver Mfg. court distinguished Skinner from Kelsay, stating that the contribution involved in
Skinner was not penal in nature. 76 III. 2d at 417, 392 N.E.2d at 1345. The Silver Mfg. court
therefore concluded the defendant was not exempted as the award against the defendant was
civil in nature. Id. For other Illinois decisions prospectively applying new torts and exempting
the parties involved in the case establishing the new tort see Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67
I11.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (tort recognized for pre-natal injuries brought on behalf of
infant); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 II1. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965) (tort responsibility for hospital beyond its liability insurance coverage was recognized);
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) (recognized that school district would be liable in tort for negligence of its employee).
77. Dissenting in Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 73 I11.2d 127, 150, 383 N.E.2d
929, 939 (1978), Justice Ryan explained his view of punitive damages in the Kelsay decision:
In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc, [citation omitted] I authored an opinion which created
a cause of action for punitive damages in a factual situation wherein I felt they were
required. In situations where conduct is reprehensible and the penalties otherwise
provided are inadequate to either deter or to punish, punitive damages may serve a
useful public purpose.
Id. at 159, 383 N.E.2d at 943 (emphasis added).
78. 74 I11. 2d at 188-89, 384 N.E.2d at 360-61.
79. Id. at 189-90, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
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CRITICISM

Although Kelsay establishes an important and necessary cause of action,

several aspects of the decision appear questionable because of the majority's
inadequate reasoning. For example, the dissent's concern that employees
may abuse this new tort80 is not even discussed by the majority. Further,
the majority's single-sentence rejection of contrary decisions by some state
courts"' is unpersuasive in light of the court's reliance on other state court
decisions. 82 Moreover, the dissent's accusation that the legislature's function is usurped by the majority is left unanswered.8 3 The final flaw in Kelsay is the court's failure to articulate factors to be considered by Illinois
courts when implying civil remedies. 84
Employee abuse of a common law discharge action is not a new concern.
In addition to the dissenting opinion, 8 5 the problem also was raised in two
cases reviewed by the majority, Loucks 8 6 and Sventko. 87 This recurring
concern over potential employee abuse reflects an unwarranted assumption
that courts cannot distinguish spurious allegations from valid claims. 88 Such
80. 74 I11.2d at 192, 384 N.E.2d at 362 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See notes 85-90 and accompanying text infra.
81. 74 I11. 2d at 183, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
82. See notes 91-97 and accompanying text infra.
83. 74 I11.2d at 193, 384 N.E.2d at 362-63 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. See notes 103-13 and accompanying text infra.
85. 74 Ill. 2d at 192, 384 N.E.2d at 362 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). justice Underwood argued that one potential negative effect of this new cause of action
allowing punitive damages was that small businesses might retain unqualified employees rather
than risk punitive damages. He speculated that these unqualified employees merely have to file
workmen's compensation claims to secure tenured employment during the time the claim is
pending. Id.
86. 551 F. 2d at 745, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1977).
87. 69 Mich. App. at 649-52, 245 N.W.2d at 151 (Allen, J., concurring). After noting that
spurious allegations could lead to trials before sympathetic juries, Judge Allen suggested that a
possible solution may be for the employer to set forth, at the time of discharge, the reasons
supporting the discharge. These reasons would demonstrate that the discharge was not intended
to discourage the employee from filing a claim and was in no way retaliatory. Id. at 650-51, 245
N.W.2d at 154-55.
88. This fear of fictitious claims was a reason one court refused to abrogate the at-will rule.
See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (court refused to
allow a private cause of action for wrongful discharge, but indicated it might modify the at-will
rule where some recognized facet of public policy was threatened). For thorough discussions of
Geary, see Summers, supra note 4, at 481-84, and A Common Law Action, supra note 13, at
1451-54.
The fear of groundless claims has been raised as a reason for not recognizing the tort of
intentional infliction of mental distress. Dean Prosser's response to such reasoning in mental
distress cases is applicable to retaliatory discharge:
So far as distinguishing true claims from false ones is concerned, what is required is
rather a careful scrutiny of the evidence supporting the claim; and the elimination
of trivialities calls for nothing more than the same common sense which has distinguished serious from trifling injuries in other fields of law.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971).
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an assumption overlooks the complex evidentiary rules and procedural practices that courts have developed to discern the truth. 89 Indeed, courts are
expert at separating real from imagined wrongs. The possibility of employees
successfully advancing unsupported discharge claims is therefore minimal,90
a fact the majority should have emphasized.
The Kelsay court's summary rejection of contrary holdings by other state
courts is another shortcoming of the Illinois decision. 91 One of these cases,
Christy v. Petrus,92 is factually identical to Kelsay but reaches an opposite
resu lt.

The Missouri Supreme Court in Christy refused to imply a civil

cause of action for retaliatory discharge because the Missouri's Workmen's
Compensation Act included criminal penalties for such practices. 9 4 One
89. The same conclusion is reached in A Common Late Action, supra note 13, at 1452-53.
See also Blades, supra note 4, at 1427-31, where the problem of proof is carefully analyzed.
Professor Blades concludes that, although there is the possible problem of juries sympathizing
with employees who make fictitious claims, "[tlhe problem of proof is not insurmountable, for
there are a number of evidentiary techniques available to the courts by which the genuineness
of a claim might be reasonably guaranteed and serious infringement of the employer's normal
right of discharge avoided." Id. at 1429. He recommends a high burden of proof for the
employee as an example of such evidentiary techniques. Id.
90. Other factors which tend to prevent fictitious claims are court delays and attorney's fees.
The more unsupported the discharge claim, the less likely an attorney would accept the case on
a contingency fee basis. Because most unemployed workers would face financial limitations resuiting from their reduced income after their discharge, few would waste money on litigation
they have little or no hope of winning.
91. 74 Ill. 2d at 183, 384 N.E.2d at 358. Several of these cases were noted by the dissent.
74 II1. 2d at 197, 384 N.E.2d at 364 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
citing Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977) (retaliatory discharge not
actionable); Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., 347 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 1961) (retaliatory
discharge not actionable); Christ), v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956) (retaliatory
discharge not actionable); Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d
148 (1950) (retaliatory discharge not actionable). The dissent did not cite two other recent cases
holding that retaliatory discharge is not actionable: Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978),
and Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, petition for discretionary review denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978). In all six of the above cases the
plaintiffs sought relief for their retaliatory discharge -after filing a workmen's compensation claim,
but were denied relief.
92. 295 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1956).
93. The Christy court concluded that the absence of a civil remedy for wrongful discharge
was an intentional omission by the Missouri legislature because it carefully provided for the
rights and compensation of injured employees covered by the Missouri Act. 295 S.W.2d at 126.
The plaintiff in Christy sought to recover actual and punitive damages for his alleged wrongful
discharge, purportedly a direct result of plaintiff filing a workmen's compensation claim. Id. at
123. For the plaintiff's allegation in Kelsay, see note 31 supra.
94. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon 1949) provided:
Every employer, his director, officer or agent, who discharges or in any way discriminates against an employee for exercising any of his rights under this chapter,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, or by
imprisonment in the county jail for not less than one week nor more than one year,
or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Quoted in 295 S.W.2d at 126. The Christy court reasoned that the criminal penalties listed
above only dealt with the consequences of wrongful discharge and placed no affirmative duty
upon the employer to refrain from such discharges. Id.

19801

KELSAY V. MOTOROLA

scholar, however, has demonstrated that Christy is analytically unsound. 95
Moreover, the Christy decision was delivered 23 years ago and no longer is
an accurate reflection of the Missouri Legislature's intention to omit a civil
remedy, if that ever was the legislature's intention. The Missouri Act was
subsequently amended to provide a civil cause of action for the wrongful
96
By
discharge of an employee who files a workmen's compensation claim.
noting this significant change in the Missouri statute and the Christy court's
unsound analysis of case law, the Kelsay majority could have demonstrated
convincingly that the Christy holding is obsolete. In contrast, Kelsay repreview that a civil action is necessary to prevent retaliasents the progressive
97
tory discharges.
An argument more vigorously asserted by the dissent is that the majority
usurped the legislature's function when it implied a civil remedy. 98 The
dissent's basic premise that "the law-making function is vested in the legislative branch" 99 is inaccurate. This argument overlooks the well-established
common law power of the judiciary to create the law. 100 The late Justice
Since the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act did not expressly provide a civil remedy,
the remaining issue was whether a civil remedy could be implied. The Missouri court relied on
the rule "that a statute which creates a criminal offense and provides a penalty for its violation
[should not] be construed as creating a new civil cause of action independently of the common
law, unless such appears by express terms or by clear implication [from] the legislative intent."
Id., citing Everett v. Littleton Const. Co., 94 N.H. 43, 46 A.2d 317 (1946). Illinois, however,
follows a different, more liberal rule when implying civil actions. The Kelsay court relied on the
2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691
Illinois rule stated in Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 I11.
(1955), that:
[t]he fact that an act is penal in nature does not bar a civil remedy, and where a
statute is enacted for the benefit of a particular class of individuals a violation of its
terms may result in civil as well as criminal liability, even though the former remedy is not specifically mentioned (emphasis added).
2d at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 359. Because Illinois follows a different implied
Quoted in 74 I11.
action rule, Kelsay is distinguishable from Christy.
95. See Gamm, The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 292, 302-06
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gamm].
96. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.780 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1979) now provides: "No employer or
agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his
rights under [the Workmen's Compensation Act]. Any employee who has been discharged or
discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages against his employer."
97. See generally Comment, Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1081 (1973), Note, A Right to Workmen's Compensation-A Dangling of the Economic
Apple?, 6 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 465 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A Dangling of the Economic
Apple]; Note, Non-statutory Causes of Action for an Employer's Termination of an "At Will"
Employment Relationship: A Possible Solution to the Economic Imbalance in the EmployerEmployee Relationship, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. REV. 743 (1979); Note, Workmen's Compensation-No Private Right of Action for Retaliatory Discharge in North Carolina, 15 WAKE
FoREST L. REV. 139 (1979).
98. 74 II1. 2d at 193, 384 N.E.2d at 362-63.
99. Id. at 190-91, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
100. This topic was analyzed extensively by former Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter V.
Schaefer, who authored the Teale decision, discussed in notes 103-13 and accompanying text
infra. See Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 3 (1966) (common law adopted
by reception statute enables courts to utilize the common law system's capacity for growth and
its ability to abandon outmoded precedents). Dean Prosser's comment is particularly appropriate
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Dooley expressed precisely this point when he stated that "[o]bviously
courts create law. If it were otherwise the common law would be as out of
touch with life as a corpse."1 0 1 Thus, the dissent's sweeping generalization
about the law-making function of the legislative branch should have been
countered by the majority with comments regarding the court's common law
heritage, particularly because Kelsay creates a common law tort independent
of the Act. 102
Perhaps the most justified criticism of the Kelsay decision is the supreme
court's superficial analysis of Teale v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. 103 In Teale,
the court refused to imply a private civil cause of action for discharge under the
Illinois Age Discrimination Act, 104 reasoning that the language adopted by the
legislature indicated an intentional omission of a civil remedy. 105 Strongly

here: "'New ... torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the common law is
marked by many cases of first impression, in which [courts have] struck out boldly to create a
new cause of action, where none had been recognized before." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS §

1, at 3 (4th ed. 1971).

Schaefer and Prosser's view of the law-making function of the courts is shared by many legal
scholars. See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1932); Bischoff, The Dynamics of Tort Law: Court or Legislature?, 4 VT. L. REV. 35 (1979); Day, Why
Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 563 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Day];
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950); Peck, The Role of the Courts and

Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48

MINN.

L. REv. 265 (1963); Traynor, The Limits of

Judicial Creativity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1025 (1978). This list is not exhaustive but does indicate
that ample authority exists for the exercise of judicial law-making power by the Kelsay court.
101. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 I11.
2d at 361, 367 N.E.2d at 1257. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo shared a similar view concerning the nature of the judicial function:
A rule which in its origin was made the creation of the courts themselves, and was
supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by
courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of the rule would do
violence to the social conscience .... This is not usurpation. It is not even innovation. It is the reservation for ourselves of the same power of creation that built up
the common law through its exercise by the judges of the past.

B.

CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW

136-37 (Greenwood Press Reprint 1973) (emphasis

added).
102. 74 I11.
2d at 187, 384 N.E.2d at 360.
103. 66 III. 2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473 (1976).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 881-87 (1975).
105. 66 II1. 2d at 5, 359 N.E.2d at 474-75. In the Teale case a discharged employee brought
an action for alleged age discrimination in his discharge under the Illinois Age Discrimination
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 881-87 (1975). The statute provided no civil remedy, so the
plaintiff urged the Illinois Supreme Court to imply one. The court refused, citing various other
employment acts that included civil remedies, then noting that the Age Discrimination Act
made no such provision. Further, the Teale court noted that the statute stated that the right it
created "shall be protected as provided herein." 66 I11.
2d at 5, 359 N.E.2d at 474, quoting ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 8 8 1(c) (1975). The Teale court concluded this provision "strongly
militate[d] against, if indeed [did] not preclude, expansion of the statutory sanction by implication." 66 IIl. 2d at 5, 359 N.E.2d at 474.
To be consistent, the Kelsay majority should have examined the relevant employment statutes
concerning discharges noted in the Teale decision. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 884, 886
(1977) (unlawful to discharge employee because of age or for exercising employee rights under

1980]

KELSAY V. MOTOROLA

relying on the Teale decision, the Kelsay dissent concluded that the absence
of a civil remedy in the 1975 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation
Act also indicated a deliberate omission by the legislature, precluding the
civil remedy sought by Kelsay. 106 In view of the Teale court's comprehensive examination of relevant employment statutes providing or omitting civil
remedies, the factual similarity of the Kelsay and Teale decisions warranted
more than the majority's brief conclusion that the Teale case involved a different statute. 107
The Kelsay-Teale dichotomy demonstrates the need for the Illinois Supreme Court to establish a consistent approach to the implied action problem. 108 The court should have articulated what factors need to be considered when determining whether a cause of action may be implied, and the
relative importance of these factors. 109 The court could consider, for examthe age discrimination law); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 39.11 (1977) (unlawful to discharge
employee for indebtedness that results in wage demands upon employer); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
62, § 88 (1977) (unlawful to discharge employee because of his garnished wages); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, § 65-23 (1977) (unlawful to discharge handicapped employee if the handicap is
unrelated to job performance). The Kelsay court should have explained why the Act's 1975
amendment and exclusivity provision were free from the internal, militating restriction found in
the Teale opinion.
A subsequent case distinguished the Teale decision and implied a civil remedy from a silent
statute. Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 60 Ill. App. 3d 616, 377 N.E.2d 242 (1st Dist. 1978).
In Walinski no specific penalty clause was present as in the Teale and Kelsay decisions. In fact,
there was clear evidence that the authors of the Illinois Constitution did not intend to exclude
civil remedies. See Note, State Constitutional Right to Damages For Private Discrimination in
Employment--Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 229 (1978).
106. 74 I11.2d at 194-96, 384 N.E.2d at 363-64.
107. Id.at 185-86, 384 N.E.2d at 359.
108. The problem is not unique to the Illinois Supreme Court. The problem of state supreme
courts failing to establish or adhere to any particular standards when implying civil actions is
prevalent throughout the United States. See Note, Implied Causes of Action in State Courts, 30
STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Implied Actions]. The author presents an overview of the implied action problem, contrasts the developed technique for implying actions in
the federal courts with the unsystematic method used in state courts, and then recommends
some approaches to the various factual situations in which the implied cause of action issue
arises. Interestingly, the Implied Actions author noted the case underpinning the Kelsay-Teale
division, Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691 (1955).
Implied Actions at 1244 n.8. Although he did not mention Heimgaertner, Justice Schaefer also
was aware of the implied action problem. See Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHi. L.
REV. 3, 21-22 (1966).
109. Because the Kelsay court analyzed different factors than the Teale court the Kelsay decision appears to overrule the Teale decision, as the dissent noted. 74 I11.2d at 194, 384 N.E.2d
at 363. Yet this appearance is misleading because in reality the court was simply adopting a
different approach to the implied action dilemma. In the Teale decision, the court exclusively
relied on statutory language for guidance in deriving the legislature's intent behind the Age
Discrimination Act. In the Kelsay decision, however, the court examined not only the statutory
language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but also that statute's long history, beneficient
purpose, and the public policy it embodied. These are clearly legitimate considerations, as note
47 supra demonstrates. The Teale approach shows that statutory language is an important factor
when implying or refusing to imply a civil action, but the Kelsay analysis indicates that la'nguage
alone is not determinative of legislative intent. Thus, because the Age Discrimination Act is
newer and less litigated, the narrow approach of the Teale court was appropriate. The Work-
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pie, the statute's language, purpose, legislative history, 110 and remedies."'
Employing some of these factors, the Kelsay court could have reasoned that
the purpose of and voluminous litigation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1 12 enabled the court to perceive more clearly the intent underlying
the Act's 1975 amendment than the intent behind the newer, less litigated
Age Discrimination Act construed in the Teale decision. Absent articulated
guidelines, implied action cases such as Kelsay and Teale appear to be inconsistent, ad hoc decisions. 113

men's Compensation Act, on the other hand, is heavily litigated and its purpose is sufficiently
clear to merit the more liberal approach of the Kelsay court.
110. The legislative history of the 1975 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act is
scant and inconclusive. The amendment did not delete any pre-existing civil action. See Workmen's Compensation Act, Pub. Act No. 79-79, 1975 I11. Laws 224. In fact, the entire provision
appearing in note 44, supra, was new in 1975. Further, the legislative debates on Senate Bill
235 (the 1975 Workmen's Compensation Act amendment) never concerned the provision construed in Kelsay. See Senate Debates (available on microfiche at the DePaul University College
of Law Library, 1975 Senate Debates, Index Card Numbers 38, 53, 55, 58, 75, 77, 123, 139 and
142). It is noteworthy that all previous amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act were
formulated by an agreed bill process, wherein members of the legislature representing both
industry and labor arrived at compromise legislation. See Stevenson, supra note 27, at 709-13.
In 1975 the agreed bill process was abandoned, apparently because labor-oriented Democrats
controlled both houses of the legislature and the executive branch. Id. Thus, the absence of a
civil action in the 1975 amendment may have been an oversight. See Recent Decisions, 68 ILL.
BaR J. 287, 290 (1979). This inference, however, is contrary to the Kelsay dissent's conclusion
that "it is unrealistic to suppose that ... the members of the General Assembly ... simply
ignored the question of civil remedies ....
..74 II1. 2d at 193, 384 N.E.2d at 362.
111. The federal courts consider similar factors when implying civil actions from complex
regulatory schemes created by federal statutes. See Implied Actions, supra note 108, at 1245-51.
See generally Gamim, supra note 95 (general discussion of implied actions and the need for the
Missouri courts to liberalize their approach to this doctrine); McMahon and Rodos, Judicial
Implication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisaland Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REv. 167
(1976) (history of judicial implication of private causes of action traced and trend away from
liberal implication under present United States Supreme Court discussed);Note, Implying Civil
Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285 (1963) (comprehensive
examination of the implied action doctrine in the federal courts).
112. See Stevenson, supra note 27, at 678-85. Mr. Stevenson states that the number of cases
filed at the Illinois Industrial Commission has nearly quadrupled since 1950, from 15,000 in that
year to 57,500 in 1977. Id. at 676. This increase in litigation has been of particular concern to
insurance companies writing workmen's compensation insurance in Illinois, as evidenced by the
88% premium increase sought and received by insurers filing with the Illinois Department of
Insurance in 1976. Id. at 711. The Kelsay decision, however, will probably have little or no
effect on workmen's compensation premiums because the tort is separate and independent of
the Act. 74 III. 2d at 184, 187, 384 N.E.2d at 358, 360. The tort of retaliatory discharge necessarily involves willful and wanton conduct, because it would be impossible to negligently terminate an employee. Torts involving willful and wanton conduct, or in this case, illegal conduct
due to the 1975 amendment, cannot be insured against because insurance policies covering the
commission of an illegal act are void as against public policy. See London Guar. & Accident Co.
v. Morris, 156 I1I. App. 533 (1st Dist. 1910).
113. A recent Illinois Appellate Court decision addressed the problem of the supreme court's
inconsistent approach to implying actions. Sherman v. Field Clinic, 74 I11. App. 3d 21, 392
N.E.2d 154 (1st Dist. 1979). The Sherman court cited six supreme and appellate court deci-
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BROAD STATUTORY PROTECTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO A COMMON LAW TORT REMEDY

Now that the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that in the workmen's
compensation context retaliatory discharge contravenes public policy, 114 it is
possible that the courts will find other abuses of the discharge power actionable in the presence of similar public policy considerations. 115 Legislation,
however, may be a more optimal approach to limiting the employer's power
to discharge employees. The problems of inconsistent judicial interpretations
and overwhelming case loads can be reduced by comprehensive legislation. 116 Further, a general definition of the employer's duty not to discharge
employees abusively would make the application of this newly created common law tort more predictable. Courts and litigants could focus their discussions on the statute rather than on broad public policy notions. 117
Numerous scholars have suggested various legislative alternatives for abusive discharges, such as expanding the authority of agencies already hearing
discharge disputes to include at-will employee terminations. 118 A simpler
sions; Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I1. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Boyer v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 38 I11.2d 31, 230 N.E.2d 173 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968);
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 I11. 2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691 (1955); Hoover v.
May Dep't Stores Co., 62 III. App. 3d 106, 378 N.E.2d 762 (5th Dist. 1978); Walinski v.
Morrison & Morrison, 60 11I.App. 3d 616, 377 N.E.2d 242 (1st Dist. 1978); and Rice v. Snarlin,
Inc., 131 11. App. 2d 434, 266 N.E.2d 183 (1st Dist. 1970). From the above cases, the Sherman
court determined that five factors should be considered when implying a cause of action from
statutes: (1) whether the alleged conduct contravenes the public policy of Illinois; (2) whether
the plaintiffs are within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect; (3) whether the
alleged injury suffered by the plaintiff is within the range of injuries the statute was designed to
prevent; (4) whether the need for a civil action is clear; and (5) whether anything in the statute
indicates an intent to limit the remedies available to those provided by the statute. 74 I11.App.
3d at 29-30, 392 N.E.2d at 160-61. For factors to be considered when implying actions that are
similar to those announced in Sherman see Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th
Cir. 1977), and Gamm, supra note 99, at 296. See also Montague v. George London Memorial
Hosp., 78 III. App. 3d 298, 396 N.E.2d 1289 (1st Dist. 1979).
114. 74 II1. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
115. For one possible extension, see text accompanying notes 132-36 infra.
116. Blades, supra note 4, at 1431-34, discusses the advantages legislation offers compared to
the judicial development of abusive discharge actions. One advantage is that the legislature can
prohibit a broader range of conduct. For example, compromising professional ethics could be
prohibited by statute, but probably not by courts acting without a statute. For a thorough
discussion of the at-will rule and professional ethics, see Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of
Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of
Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REv. 805 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Professional Ethics].
117. This was recommended by Professor Blades, supra note 4, at 1432-33. For some factors
courts consider when formulating public policy, see note 47 supra.
118. Professor Summers suggests a statute that makes the present labor law arbitration system available to all employees. Summers, supra note 4, at 519-32. The author of Professional
Ethics recommends a statute that includes prohibitions against compromising a professional
employee's ethics. Professional Ethics, supra note 116, at 829. Professor Peck proposes the
enlargement of the jurisdiction of federal and state agencies presently hearing improper discharge claims. Some Kind of Hearing, supra note 4, at 323. Professor Blades also proposed the
utilization of existing commissions that hear discharge claims. Blades, supra note 4, at 1433.
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solution would be to amend the Workmen's Compensation Act to include
civil remedies for retaliatory discharge, 119 although such a change has been
rendered unnecessary in Illinois by the Kelsay decision. A more comprehensive approach, however, might be more suitable in order to prevent retaliatory discharges in other contexts. A statute might contain the following
broad language:
Section 1: Definition-Retaliatory discharge includes, but is not limited
to, any discharge intended to discourage or prevent an employee from
pursuing a right or remedy authorized by the laws of Illinois or to penalize
an employee who has initiated any action in pursuit of such right or remedy. The burden of proof shall be on the employee.
Section 2: Remedies and Sanctions-(a) An employee shall have a civil
action for compensatory and exemplary damages for any discharge as defined in Section 1; (b) an employee shall have the right to be reinstated with
back pay from the date of the discharge as defined in Section 1; (c)
an employer shall he subject to a $10,000 fine fbr each discharge defined
in Section 1, to be enforced in a criminal proceeding brought by the Attorney General or State's Attorney, or by any other agency empowered to
bring such action.
Section 3: Statutory Construction-Sections 1 and 2 shall be liberally construed to effectuate the policy of employee protection from retaliatory discharge.

By adopting such a general statute, 120 Illinois would extend vital protection to an area of increasing importance, the employee's need to be free
from arbitrary or unlawful dismissal. The employee has the burden of proof
in order to shield employers from fraudulent claims.

121

Except for the bur-

den of proof, the employee is afforded considerable protection because the
sample statute provides private civil remedies capable of enforcement in-

dependent of any executive agency action.

122

The employee also has job

119. Missouri has taken this step. See note 96 supra.
120. Texas has a similar statute, which provides:
Section 1. No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against
any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer
to represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any
proceeding under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding.
Section 2. A person who violates any provision of Section 1 of this Act shall be
liable fi)r reasonable damages suffered by an employee as a result of the violation,

and an employee discharged in violation of the Act shall be entitled to be reinstated
to his former position. The burden of proof shall be upon the employee.
TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Cuin. Supp. 1978).
121. See notes 85-90 and accompanying text supra.
122. See Gamin, supra note 95, at 298; Implied Actions, supra note 108, at 1260. Both
articles discuss the problem of executive agency inaction and unresponsiveness. The inaction of
an executive agency effectively deprives an injured citizen of a remedy. Agency inaction therefore is a reason for courts to imply a private cause of action.
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security through the provision for reinstatement with back pay. 123 More importantly, the statutory definition covers a broad spectrum of employer misconduct in terminating employees, rather than just objectionable practices
occurring in the workmen's compensation context. 124 The mounting scholarly attack on the employer's right to discharge, 125 the proliferation of lawsuits challenging unjust dismissals in recent years, 126 and the volume of
legislation regulating employment practices 12 7 are compelling evidence that
the time has come for a comprehensive statute protecting the employee's
right to seek redress without fear of employer reprisal. 128
IMPACT OF KELSAY

The Kelsay decision obviously modifies prior law by creating an exception
to the old Illinois rule that an employer's power to discharge an at-will
employee is absolute. The new rule limits an employer's otherwise absolute
power to discharge at-will employees where its exercise contravenes the
public policy of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 129 It seems logical that
the supreme court will advance the public policy theory to other instances of
retaliatory discharge if an applicable statute evinces strong public policy considerations. 130 Further, it is possible that the court will extend the public
policy exception to situations not covered by legislation if the court is convinced that some established public policy is undermined by an employer's
discharge practices. 131
An example of a logical extension based on a statute would be the discharge of a white-collar employee for refusing to commit a criminal act. 132
123. Reinstatement with back pay is a remedy commonly provided by collective bargaining
agreements and is authorized by the National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1976). Professor Blades also suggested reinstatement with back pay as a remedy for abusive
discharge. See Blades, supra note 4, at 1414.
124. See Blades, supra note 4, at 1432.
125. See articles cited in notes 4, 13, 16, 22, and 97 supra.
126. See cases cited in notes 22 and 55 supra.
127. See legislation cited in notes 19, 20, and 105 supra.
128. See generally Summers, supra note 4, at 519-31.
129. See note 1 supra.
130. The most obvious example of a statute evincing clear public policy considerations is the
criminal code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 (1977). The key will be the clarity of the public policy, not
its source. One author persuasively argues that the public policy exception will be expanded
only in areas concerning the public interest, largely because of the prevailing judicial attitude
that the economic freedom of both the employer and employee is fundamental in our society.
See Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee, supra note 22, at 777-806. One Illinois
judge, however, already has called for the extension of the Kelsay public policy exception. See
Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 70 II1. App. 3d 233, 244-45, 388 N.E.2d 265, 273 (4th Dist.
1979) (Craven, J., dissenting). Another appellate court decision recognized that retaliatory discharges are actionable, but refused relief because the plaintiff alleged violations of express and
implied contracts, rather than the commission of a tort. See Sargent v. Illinios Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1979).
131. See notes 137-39 and accompanying text infra.
132. See Peterman v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (dismissal of employee for refusing to commit perjury violated public policy).
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Before the Kelsay decision, an honest accountant whose employer demanded
falsification of financial records would have the unenviable choice of either
risking his or her job for objecting to the request or engaging in criminal
activities. 133 After the Kelsay decision, the same accountant could comply
with the law without suffering the same extreme economic burdens following
termination. The employee could recover compensatory damages against the
former employer, assuming the discharge resulted from the accountant's refusal to alter the financial records as directed.
In addition to compensatory damages, the accountant could seek punitive
damages for his or her retaliatory discharge, as per the Kelsay majority's
dicta. 134 Punitive damages would be particularly appropriate in this example
because they would punish and deter this outrageous employer conduct, as
well as encourage employees to reveal to prosecutors criminal evidence that
otherwise may be unobtainable. 135 These salutary effects are made possible
by the economic incentives of compensatory and punitive damages authorized in the Kelsay decision. As this hypothetical demonstrates, the
common law tort of retaliatory discharge easily can be extended beyond the
facts of the Kelsay case. The public policy against criminal activity is at least
as strong as that manifested in the Workmen's Compensation Act. 136
Extension of the public policy exception will not depend solely on the
existence of a statute. As in the Kelsay decision, the supreme court can
exercise its law-making power to extend the exception where there is no
statute. Indeed, expansion of the exception via judicial activism seems more
likely than a legislative response because powerful interest groups probably
would oppose such legislation. 137 Judicial expansion is appropriate here because retaliatory discharge is a common law tort, 138 and the development of
common law torts is one of the most recognized and legitimate functions of
the courts. 139
Assuming future Illinois decisions or legislation expand the scope of
employee rights in retaliatory discharges, the new remedy recognized in the
Kelsay decision could become a major factor in employer-employee rela-

133. A more detailed discussion of a similar hypothetical appears in Professional Ethics, supra
note 116.
134. 74 Ill. 2d at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
135. Reporting of employer violations by employees is known as "whistleblowing." See generally Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee, supra note 22, at 777-806.
136. In Professional Ethics, supra note 116, it is argued that the public policy exception
should extend to cover situations where employers force employees to commit ethical violations
because of the tremendous impact professional employees have on the everyday affairs of society. See Professional Ethics, supra note 116, at 808-09, 826-29.
137. See Some Kind of Hearing, supra note 4, at 316-17. Professor Peck contends that legislation occurs because of efforts by interested and effective lobbying groups. Id. at 317. Employers
would not support such a proposal, nor would organized labor. Id. Labor unions would oppose a
bill outlawing unjust dismissal because job protection is one of a labor union's most persuasive
benefits. Id. See generally Unjust Employment Discharges, supra note 19, at 3.
138. 74 I11. 2d at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
139. See generally Day, supra note 100.
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tions. 140 At-will employees comprise well over half the United States work
force. 141 This category of employees, often unorganized, appears to be losing its bargaining power as economic control becomes more concentrated in
corporate employers. 142 Unable to present a united front, at-will employees
cannot demand the contractual protection from retaliatory discharge present
in nearly all union collective bargaining agreements. 143 With labor unions
representing a declining percentage of the total work force, 144 the protection
provided by collective bargaining agreements will not be available to an increasing number of employees. Absent statutory or contractual protection,
the tort recognized in the Kelsay decision becomes an important remedy for
at-will employees in Illinois.
CONCLUSION

Illinois has followed a judicial trend emerging throughout the United
States that seeks to limit an employer's absolute power to discharge at-will
employees. By recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge, the Illinois Su-

140. See generally A Dangling of the Economic Apple, supra note 97.
141. This is a conservative estimate. Professor Peck estimates that "between [60] and [65%]
of [the nonagricultural] work force is employed under contracts of employment that are terminable at will and hence terminable without cause." Unjust Employment Discharges, supra note
19, at 9.
142. See Blades, supra note 4, at 1405 n.6.
143. See Summers, supra note 4, at 499 n.104, where the author notes that in 1975 it was
estimated that 79% of all collective bargaining agreements surveyed had provisions for dismissal
only with "cause" or "just cause."
144. The U.S. Department of Labor published the following information on Sept. 3, 1979:
When Canadian members are excluded from the total, membership in U.S. labor
organizations increased to 22.8 million in 1978 (Table 2). As a proportion of total
labor force, however, membership declined by more than one percentage point between 1976 and 1978, continuing the decline that had been briefly reversed in 1974.
Membership in the U.S. represented 22.2 percent of the labor force in 1978 and
26.6 percent of employment in nonagricultural establishments.
U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics release on Sept. 3, 1979, at 2 (emphasis added).
Table 2 is printed below.

Total labor force

Year

Total
Membership

1970
1972
1974
1976
1978

21,248
21,657
22,809
22,662
22,798

Employees in nonagricultural
establishments

Number

Percent
Union
Members

Number

Percent
Union
Members

85,903
88,991
93,240
96,917
102,537

24.7
24.3
24.5
23.4
22.2

70,880
73,675
78,265
79,382
85,763

30.0
29.4
29.1
28.5
26.6
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preme Court has provided an effective remedy for a segment of the labor
force that is unable to protect itself from employer abuse. Although the Kelsay decision relied on broad public policy considerations, legislation could
overcome any confusion regarding this new cause of action by focusing on
the nature of the employer's conduct, rather than solely emphasizing public
policy determinants. Even in the absence of legislation, the scope of prohibited employer conduct subject to retaliatory discharge actions can be expanded by the judiciary exercising its law-making power. Considering the
obvious importance of secure employment, one scholar's comment regarding
Frampton seems equally appropriate for Kelsay: "It is odd that such a deci' 145
sion was so long in coming."
William Lynch Schaller

145. LARSON, supra note 58, at 57, quoted in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I1.2d at 183, 384
N.E.2d at 358.

